The Shifting Balance of Power in Syria and Iraq

The official entry of Turkey in the international effort to defeat the Islamic State (IS) militant group suggests that the balance of power in the civil wars underway in Syria and Iraq is about to change dramatically.  However, it remains to be seen how many resources and how much political capital Turkey is willing to commit to the effort to defeat the Islamic State.  Should Turkey choose to carry out only limited airstrikes on IS targets (much as the United State-led international coalition has done), then little is likely to change on the ground in Syria or Iraq.  Nevertheless, we have repeatedly suggested that Turkey was the only local power with the armed forces capable of defeating the IS on the ground and, should Turkey decide to carry out a ground offensive against the Islamic State, then its days in charge in much of Syria and Iraq are likely to be numbered.  However, peace in both countries is likely to prove to be elusive.

Two potentially game-changing developments have occurred in recent days that hold the potential to dramatically alter the situation in Syria’s long-running civil war.  First, Turkey has responded to the first attacks by the Islamic State inside Turkey by launching a series of airstrikes on IS targets in Syria, and by allowing the United States to use its Incirlik air base in southern Turkey for carrying out missions against IS targets in Syria and Iraq.  This brings the one local military that can defeat the Islamic State on the ground into the conflict, while opening a whole new series of possible missions for the US military thanks to the proximity of its Incirlik air base to the conflict zones in Syria and Iraq. 

The other major recent development in Syria was the admission by Syria’s embattled President Bashar al-Assad that government forces in Syria were facing major manpower shortages that were impairing their ability to hold ground in many areas of Syria.  This will likely result in Syrian government forces redirecting their efforts to protecting government strongholds from the Syrian coast in the northwest to the country’s capital, Damascus, in the south.  However, government forces are under pressure across the country from the wide range of militants arranged against them and are likely to remain on the defensive in the coming months.

Meanwhile, the situation in Iraq’s ongoing civil war is also undergoing a series of major changes brought about by the changing political situation across the region.  First, Turkey’s entry into the war against the Islamic State has also resulted in Turkey resuming its air strikes on Kurdish militants based in northern Iraq, a move that was designed to appease nationalist elements in Turkey that were opposed to these air strikes on the IS.  How this impacts the ability of the Kurdish Peshmerga to push back Islamic State forces in northern Iraq remains unclear, but it could restrict their ability to gain more ground from the IS in the coming months. 

At the same time, the recent rapprochement between the United States and Iran might just allow these two long-time rivals to better coordinate their efforts to defeat the Islamic State in Iraq and drive them out of many of their strongholds in that country.  Given Iran’s strong influence over the Shiite-dominated government in Baghdad as well as over many of the leading Shiite militia groups in Iraq, its cooperation in the war against the Islamic State is vital for it to be successful in Iraq.

For Syria’s Sunni majority and Iraq’s Sunni minority, these recent developments are quite worrisome.  First, while many Syrian and Iraqi Sunnis have welcomed the rise of the Islamic State, the IS’ ability to provide basic services to the populations under their control is being eroding by the internal and external campaigns against the IS and this is leading to more discontent in regions under their control.  Furthermore, the IS’ strict enforcement of its radical brand of Islam has alienated many segments of Sunni society in both countries, costing the Islamic State much of its support.  In Syria, Sunnis certainly welcome the weakening position of the Assad regime, particularly as most of its support is coming from the country’s minorities.  However, a total defeat of the Assad regime is likely to lead to a scramble for power among the various Sunni groups that are fighting against the Syrian government across that country, suggesting that peace is still far away. 

In Iraq, the country’s Sunni minority dreads the potential victory of the Iraqi government and its Shiite militia allies, as sectarian tensions in that country remain extremely high.  As a result, while the entrance of Turkey into the conflict against the IS in Syria and the potential for more Iranian involvement in the war against the IS in Iraq could spell the beginning of the end for the Islamic State, peace is likely to remain elusive in both countries.