8 July 2015

How Perceptions Influence the Balance of Power

As I have mentioned, perceptions of power and the balance of power go a long way towards determining how the balance of power impacts the world in terms of politics, economics, security and culture.  For example, a state that is perceived as being powerful by its own people is much more likely to pursue aggressive policies aimed at enforcing its perceived power on its rivals.  In contrast, a state that is perceived as weak, or one whose power is severely underestimated by its own people, is much more likely to pursue political, military and economic policies that are more defensive in nature. 

Likewise, the perceptions of a state’s power by other states also play a massive role in the policies that a state will find itself pursuing.  For example, a state that is perceived to be weak will find itself forced into defensive positions by states that perceive themselves to be stronger.  For example, the policies of European countries (as well as the United States and Japan) towards China in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, were the policies of states perceived to be strong by China, and who, in turn, perceived China to be much weaker than its capabilities.  Likewise, states that have been powerful for an extended period of time are likely to think of states whose power levels have been much lower as being weaker than they actually are.  Altogether, perception plays a major role in how the balance of power evolves, even if perception plays a relatively small role in determining most aspects of a state’s real power.

Perceptions of power are often influenced by historical factors.  For example, many European states today often overrate their own power due to the fact that they were the world’s leading powers for an extended period of time that stretched into the 20th century.  Likewise, Japan’s perceived power is influenced by the fact that it dominated East Asia for a five-decade period that only ended with its total defeat in the Second World War.  Likewise, young states, or states with a recent history of weakness, are inevitably underrated when it comes to power, at least until they can concretely display their new-found power in a way that leaves older powers with little doubt where the balance of power is tilting.  The pre-World-War-One United States is a perfect example of this, for while some more advanced European analysts recognized the tremendous potential power of the US, most European leaders chose to write off the United States as a middling power with little in the way of military capabilities.  Likewise, European and Chinese leaders discounted the rise of Japan in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, because, for so long, their own power had dwarfed that of Japan.  Moreover, European leaders discounted Asians in general, while Chinese leaders discounted everyone else in Asia but themselves.

Culture can also play a major role in developing and influencing the perceptions of a state’s power.  For example, more Universalist cultures such as those of the United States, China, Britain or France tend to support the notion that a state should aim to project its power whenever and wherever possible.  For example, the British mercantilist culture played a vital role in the expansion of Britain’s economic, trade and investment ties throughout the world.  Likewise, France’s attempts at promoting French culture as the world’s leading culture led it to expand its empire to all corners of the world, especially as French military power in continental Europe waned.